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Abstract
This paper introduces the reader into the apparatus behind the popular
New Keynesian Phillips (NKPC) curve. It derives several log-linear versions
of this curve and recursive formulations of the Calvo-Yun price staggering
model that is behind this curve. These formulations can be used for higher-
order approximations of the NKPC or for implementations that use other
non-linear solution techniques, as, e.g., projection methods.
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1 Basic Framework
1.1 Production Functions
There is a continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The demand function of firm j
is
Yjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)
−ǫ
Yt, ǫ > 1, (1.1)
where Pjt, Pt, and Yt denote the firm’s price, the aggregate price level, and aggregate
output, respectively. The price index is given by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−ǫjt dj
) 1
1−ǫ
. (1.2)
The demand function (1.1) derives from minimizing the costs to purchase the bundle
PtYt =
∫ 1
0
PjtYjtdj, where
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
ǫ−1
ǫ
jt dj
) ǫ
ǫ−1
. (1.3)
The production function is either
Yjt = ZtN
1−α
jt α ∈ (0, 1] (1.4)
or
Yjt = ZtN
1−α
jt K
α
jt α ∈ (0, 1). (1.5)
In the first case (considered for instance by Gal´ı et a. (2001)) labor Njt is the
single factor of production. In the second case (considered for instance by Heer
and Maußner (2009) or Christiano et al. (2005)) capital services Kjt are an addi-
tional factor of production. Zt is a productivity shock common to all firms. Cost
minimization at the given real wage wt implies
wt = (1− α)gjtZtN
−α
jt (1.6)
in the case of production function (1.4) and
wt = gjt(1− α)Zt(Kjt/Njt)
α, (1.7a)
rt = gjtαZt(Kjt/Njt)
α−1 (1.7b)
in the case of (1.5).
There is an important difference between the two settings. In the second case the
first-order conditions (1.7) ensure that all firms choose the same capital-labor ratio
kt := Kjt/Njt = Kt/Nt. Hence, all firms have the same marginal costs gt = gjt∀j ∈
[0, 1]. This does not hold in the case of production function (1.4) unless α = 1.
3
1.2 Aggregation
Aggregate output in this economy is given by (1.3). However, this will not allow us
to define output in terms of sums of factor inputs. Yun (1996) proposes to use a
second price index P˜t defined by
P˜t =
(∫ 1
0
P−ǫjt dj
)−1
ǫ
(1.8)
so that
Y˜t :=
∫ 1
0
Yjtdj
(1.1)
=
(
PjtPt
Y t
)
=
(
Pt
P˜t
)ǫ
Yt. (1.9)
In the case of production function (1.5) this allows us to relate Yt to aggregate
labor input Nt =
∫ 1
0
Njtdj and aggregate capital input Kt =
∫ 1
0
Kjtdj: since kjt =
(Kjt/Njt) = kt for all firms, we get
Y˜t =
∫ 1
0
Yjtdj =
∫ 1
0
ZtNjtk
α
t dj = ZtNtk
α
t = ZtN
1−α
t K
α
t .
In addition, we can rewrite equation (1.7) in terms of aggregate variables:
wt = gt(1− α)ZtN
−α
t K
α
t , (1.10a)
rt = gtαZtN
1−α
t K
α−1
t . (1.10b)
It is not possible to follow the same procedure in the case of production function
(1.4). Since
Y˜t =
∫ 1
0
Yjtdj =
∫ 1
0
ZtN
1−α
jt dj 6= ZtN
1−α
t ,
we define
N˜1−αt =
∫ 1
0
N1−αjt dj (1.11)
so that
Y˜t = ZtN˜
1−α
t . (1.12)
Accordingly, we define aggregate marginal costs g˜ by
wt = g˜t(1− α)ZtN˜
−α
t . (1.13)
This allows us to relate the marginal costs of firm j to our meassure of average
marginal costs g˜t: from (1.6) and (1.13):
gjt
g˜t
(
Njt
N˜t
)
−α
.
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Using (1.1) and the aggregate production function (1.12) to substitute for Njt/N˜t
we can write:
gjt = g˜t
(
Pjt
Pt
)−αǫ
1−α
(
Yt
Y˜t
) α
1−α
. (1.14)
1.3 Price Setting
In each period (1 − ϕ) of the firms are allowed to set their relative price Pjt/Pt
optimally. Henceforth we use the index A to refer to these firms. The remaining
fraction of firms, indexed by N , adjusts their price according to a rule of thumb.
We consider two rules. The first rule implies a forward-looking Phillips curve. We
assume,
PNt+1 = πPNt, πt :=
Pt
Pt−1
, (1.15a)
where πt is the inflation factor (1 plus the rate of inflation) and π its value in a
non-stochastic stationary equilibrium. Note that with zero inflation (i.e. π = 1)
these firms do not change their nominal price. The second rule (used in Christiano
et al. (2005) and Walsh (2005)) accounts for the backward-looking element in the
Phillips curve. It posits
PNt+1 = πtPNt. (1.15b)
Since 1 − ϕ firms choose Pjt = PAt and the remaining fraction sets Pjt = PNt, the
formula for the price index (1.2) implies
P 1−ǫt = (1− ϕ)P
1−ǫ
At + ϕP
1−ǫ
Nt . (1.16)
In the case of the first rule of thumb this implies
P 1−ǫt = (1− ϕ)P
1−ǫ
At + ϕ(πPNt−1)
1−ǫ. (1.17a)
For the second rule we get
P 1−ǫt = (1− ϕ)P
1−ǫ
At + ϕ(πt−1PNt−1)
1−ǫ. (1.17b)
Since PNt−1 is itself an index of the prices of those firms that adjusted their price in
t− 2 optimally and those firms that obeyed to a rule of thumb,
P 1−ǫNt−1 = (1− ϕ)P
1−ǫ
At−1 + ϕ(πt−2PNt−2)
1−ǫ, (1.18)
5
we can derive a recursive formulation for the price index. I demonstrate this for the
updating scheme (1.15b):
P 1−ǫt = ϕP
1−ǫ
At + ϕ(πt−1PNt−1)
1−ǫ,
(1.18)
= ϕP 1−ǫAt + ϕ(1− ϕ)(πt−1PAt−1)
1−ǫ + ϕ2(πt−1πt−2PNt−2)
1−ǫ,
(1.18)
= ϕP 1−ǫAt + ϕ(1− ϕ)(πt−1PAt−1)
1−ǫ + ϕ2(1− ϕ)(πt−1πt−2PAt−2)
1−ǫ + . . . .
Therefore,
(πt−1Pt−1)
1−ǫ = ϕ(πt−1PAt−1)
1−ǫ + ϕ2(1− ϕ)(πt−1πt−2PAt−2)
1−ǫ
+ ϕ3(1− ϕ)(πt−1πt−2πt−3PAt−3)
1−ǫ + . . . ,
and, thus,
P 1−ǫt = (1− ϕ)P
1−ǫ
At + ϕ(πt−1Pt−1)
1−ǫ. (1.19a)
Similarly, we can derive a recursive formulation of equation (1.17a):
P 1−ǫt = (1− ϕ)P
1−ǫ
At + ϕ(πPt−1)
1−ǫ. (1.19b)
In the case of rule (1.15a) this implies the following relation between the relative
price of firms that optimally adjust their price and the inflation factor :
1 = (1− ϕ)(PAt/Pt)
1−ǫ + ϕ(π/πt)
1−ǫ. (1.20a)
In the case of rule (1.15b) this relation is
1 = (1− ϕ)(PAt/Pt)
1−ǫ + ϕ(πt−1/πt)
1−ǫ. (1.20b)
The same line of reasoning applied to
qt :=
(
P˜t
Pt
)
−ǫ
=
∫ 1
0
(
Pjt
Pt
)
−ǫ
dj = (1− ϕ)(PAt/Pt) + ϕ(PNt/Pt)
yields:
qt = (1− ϕ)(PAt/Pt)
−ǫ + ϕ(πt/π)
ǫqt−1, (1.21a)
and
qt = (1− ϕ)(PAt/Pt)
−ǫ + ϕ(πt/πt−1)
ǫqt−1, (1.21b)
respectively.
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Given qt we can write the aggregate resource constraint as
Yt =
1
qt
ZtN
1−α
t K
α
t (1.22)
if the production function is given by (1.5) or as
Yt =
1
qt
ZtN˜
1−α
t , (1.23)
if the production function is given by (1.4). Note that our measure of aggregate
labor input is related to Nt =
∫ 1
0
Njtdj, NAt and NNt via:
N˜1−αt = (1− ϕ)N
1−α
At + ϕN
1−α
Nt ,
NNt =
Nt − (1− ϕ)NAt
ϕ
. (1.24)
2 The Optimal Price
2.1 Preliminaries
Now consider a firm in period t that is allowed to set its price optimally at PAt.
As long as the firm will not be able to optimize again, its price in period t + s,
s = 1, 2, . . . is related to PAt according to
Pjt+s = π
sPAt, (2.1a)
Pjt+s =
s∏
i=1
πt+i−1PAt, (2.1b)
where the first equation holds for rule (1.15a) and the second equation rests on rule
(1.15b). Note that the aggregate price level can be written as
Pt+s =
s∏
i=1
πt+iPt. (2.2)
and, thus, the relative price is either given by
Pjt+s
Pt+s
=
πs∏s
i=1 πt+i
PAt
Pt
, (2.3a)
or by
Pjt+s
Pt+s
=
πt
πt+s
PAt
Pt
. (2.3b)
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2.2 First-Order Conditions
The profit per unit of output in terms of the aggregate price level equals
Gjt+s =
Pjt+1
Pt+s
Yjt+s − C(Yjt+s),
=
(
Pjt+1
Pt+1
)1−ǫ
Yt − C
((
Pjt+1
Pt+1
)
−ǫ
Yt
)
, (2.4)
where C(·) is the cost function with derivative c′(·) = gjt+s. Differentiating this
function with respect to PAt/Pt yields:
∂Gjt+s
∂PAt/Pt
=
πs∏s
i=1 πt+i
Yjt+s − ǫ
(
πs∏s
i=1 πt+i
PAt
Pt
− gjt+s
)
Yjt+s
PAt/Pt
,
=
1
PAt/Pt
(
(1− ǫ)
πs∏s
i=1 πt+i
PAt
Pt
+ ǫgjt+s
)
Yjt+s,
=
1− ǫ
PAt/Pt
(
πs∏s
i=1 πt+i
PAt
Pt
−
ǫ
ǫ− 1
gjt+s
)
Yjt+s, (2.5a)
if Pjt+s/Pt+s is given by (2.3a) and
∂Gjt+s
∂PAt/Pt
=
πt
πt+s
Yjt+s − ǫ
(
πtPAt
πt+sPt
− gjt+s
)
Yjt+s
PAt/Pt
,
=
1
PAt/Pt
(
(1− ǫ)
πtPAt
πt+sPt
+ ǫgjt+s
)
Yjt+s,
=
1− ǫ
PAt/Pt
(
πtPAt
πt+sPt
−
ǫ
ǫ− 1
gjt+s
)
Yjt+s. (2.5b)
if Pjt+s/Pt+s equals (2.3b). The firm chooses PAt/Pt to maximize the discounted
stream of profits:
max
PAt/Pt
Et
∞∑
s=0
ϕsϕt+sGjt+s, (2.6)
where ϕt denotes the discount factor. The first order condition for this problem is:
0 = Et
∞∑
s=0
ϕsϕt+s
∂Gjt+s
∂PAt/Pt
. (2.7)
Since the common non-stochastic term 1−ǫ
PAt/Pt
in (2.5a) and (2.5b) can be canceled
in (2.7) we obtain
0 = Et
∞∑
s=0
ϕsϕt+s
(
πs∏s
i=1 πt+i
PAt
Pt
−
ǫ
ǫ− 1
gjt+s
)
Yjt+s, (2.8a)
0 = Et
∞∑
s=0
ϕsϕt+s
(
πtPAt
πt+sPt
−
ǫ
ǫ− 1
gjt+s
)
Yjt+s. (2.8b)
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The household’s Euler equation implies
ϕt+s = β
sλt+s
λt
. (2.9)
for the stochastic discount factor. This allows us to simplify equations (2.8) further:
0 = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)sλt+sYjt+s
(
πs∏s
i=1 πt+i
PAt
Pt
−
ǫ
ǫ− 1
gjt+s
)
, (2.10a)
0 = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)sλt+sYjt+s
(
πtPAt
πt+sPt
−
ǫ
ǫ− 1
gjt+s
)
, (2.10b)
where we canceled λt (a non-stochastic variable from the point of view of period t).
2.3 Recursive Formulation of the First-Order Conditions
It is convenient to replace the infinite sums in the first-order conditions (2.10a)
and (2.10b) (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)). Consider condition (2.10a). If
marginal costs are equal across firms, it can be rewritten as
PAt
Pt
=
µΓ1t
Γ2t
, µ :=
ǫ
ǫ− 1
,
Γ1t := Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)s
(
πsPAt∏s
i=1 πt+iPt
)
−ǫ
Yt+1gt+sλt+s,
Γ2t := Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)s
(
PAt
Pt
)
−ǫ(
πs∏s
i=1 πt+i
)1−ǫ
Yt+sλt+s. (2.11)
Since
Γ1t = Et
{(
PAt
Pt
)
−ǫ
Ytλtgt + (βϕ)
(
πPAt
πt+1Pt
)
−ǫ
Yt+1λt+1gt+1
+ (βϕ)2
(
π2PAt
πt+1πt+2Pt
)
−ǫ
Yt+2λt+2gt+2 + . . .
}
, (2.12)
we get
Γ1t+1 = Et+1
{(
PAt+1
Pt+1
)
−ǫ
Yt+1λt+1gt+1 + (βϕ)
(
πPAt+1
πt+2Pt+1
)
−ǫ
Yt+2λt+2gt+2
+ (βϕ)2
(
π2PAt+1
πt+2πt+3Pt+1
)
−ǫ
Yt+3λt+3gt+3 + . . .
}
.
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From the point of view of period t + 1 all variables dated t + 1 and earlier are
non-stochastic and can be post-multiplied the expectations operator Et+1. Thus,
βϕ
(
π(PAt/Pt)
πt+1(PAt+1/Pt+1)
)
−ǫ
Γ1t+1 = Et+1
{
(βϕ)
(
πPAt
πt+1Pt
)
−ǫ
Yt+1λt+1gt+1
+ (βϕ)2
(
π2PAt
πt+1πt+2Pt
)
−ǫ
Yt+2λt+2gt+2 + . . .
}
By the law of iterated expectations, EtEt+1{·} = Et{·} so that the right-hand side
of (2.12) equals:
Γ1t =
(
PAt
Pt
)
−ǫ
Ytλtgt + βϕEt
(
π(PAt/Pt)
πt+1(PAt+1/Pt+1)
)
−ǫ
Γ1t+1. (2.13)
In the same way, we can derive a recursive definition of Γ2t:
Γ2t =
(
PAt
Pt
)
−ǫ
Ytλt + βϕEt
(
PAt/Pt
PAt+1/Pt+1
)
−ǫ(
π
πt+1
)1−ǫ
Γ2t+1. (2.14)
Similarly, we can derive a recursive formulation of the first-order condition (2.10b):
PAt
Pt
=
µΓ1t
Γ2t
, µ :=
ǫ
ǫ− 1
,
Γ1t :=
(
PAt
Pt
)
−ǫ
Ytλtgt + (βϕ)Et
(
πt(PAt/Pt)
πt+1(PAt+1/Pt+1)
)
−ǫ
Γ1t+1,
Γ2t :=
(
PAt
Pt
)
−ǫ
Ytλt + βϕEt
(
PAt/Pt
PAt+1/Pt+1
)
−ǫ(
πt
πt+1
)1−ǫ
Γ2t+1. (2.15)
In the case of the production function (1.4) we substitute for gjt+s from equation
(1.14) and obtain from (2.10a):
PAt
Pt
=
µΓ1t
Γ2t
, µ :=
ǫ
ǫ− 1
,
Γ1t :=
(
PAt
Pt
) −ǫ
1−α
Y
1
1−α
t Y˜
−α
1−α
t λtg˜t + (βϕ)Et
(
π(PAt/Pt)
πt+1(PAt+1/Pt+1)
) −ǫ
1−α
Γ1t+1,
Γ2t :=
(
PAt
Pt
)
−ǫ
Ytλt + βϕEt
(
PAt/Pt
PAt+1/Pt+1
)
−ǫ(
π
πt+1
)1−ǫ
Γ2t+1. (2.16)
and from (2.10b):
PAt
Pt
=
µΓ1t
Γ2t
, µ :=
ǫ
ǫ− 1
,
Γ1t :=
(
PAt
Pt
) −ǫ
1−α
Y
1
1−α
t Y˜
−α
1−α
t λtg˜t + (βϕ)Et
(
πt(PAt/Pt)
πt+1(PAt+1/Pt+1)
) −ǫ
1−α
Γ1t+1,
Γ2t :=
(
PAt
Pt
)
−ǫ
Ytλt + βϕEt
(
PAt/Pt
PAt+1/Pt+1
)
−ǫ(
πt
πt+1
)1−ǫ
Γ2t+1. (2.17)
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3 Log-Linear Equations
3.1 The Stationary Solution
Consider the non-stochastic equilibrium with constant inflation factor π. Equations
(1.20a) and (1.20b) imply PAt/Pt = 1. In addition, PNt/Pt = 1 (see (1.15a) and
(1.15b)). Thus all firms produce the same amount Yjt = Y at the same marginal
costs gjt = g. In this case, both equation (2.10a) and (2.10b) imply
g =
ǫ− 1
ǫ
. (3.1)
To embed any of our models of sticky prices into a linearized model we can
linearize PAt/Pt = µΓ1t/Γ2t together with the respective recursive formulations. It
has, however, become common practice to linearize (2.10a) or (2.10b) directly to get
a Phillips curve equation that relates the current rate of inflation to expected future
inflation, past inflation, and a measure of cost pressure.
3.2 First Steps
When we linearize equation (2.10a) and (2.10b) at the stationary solution we can
disregard the terms involving λˆt+s and Yˆjt+s since these terms are multiplied by the
term in square brackets that vanishes at the stationary solution. Let pˆt := P̂At/Pt.
Then the log-linear version of (2.10a) can be written as
0 = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)sλY

pˆt − s∑
i=1
πˆt+i −
ǫ
ǫ− 1
g︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
gˆjt+s

 ,
λY
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)s︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1/(1−βϕ)
pˆt = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)sλY
[
s∑
i=1
πˆt+i + gˆjt+s
]
,
pˆt = (1− βϕ)Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)s
[
s∑
i=1
πˆt+i + gˆjt+s
]
. (3.2a)
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Similarly, we obtain the log-linear version of (2.10b):
0 = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)sλY

pˆt + πˆt − πˆt+s − ǫǫ− 1g︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
gˆjt+s

 ,
λY
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)s︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1/(1−βϕ)
[pˆt + πˆt] = λY Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)s [πˆt+s + gˆjt+s] ,
pˆt + πˆt = (1− βϕ)Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)s [πˆt+s + gˆjt+s] . (3.2b)
Log-linearizing equation (1.20a) at PAt/Pt = 1 yields
pˆt =
ϕ
1− ϕ
πˆt. (3.3a)
Furthermore
̂(PNt/Pt) = −πˆt, (3.3b)
since PNt/Pt = π/πt in the case of (1.15a). If non-optimizers change their price
according to the rule of thumb in equation (1.15b) the relation between pˆt and the
rate of inflation is given by
pˆt =
ϕ
1− ϕ
(πˆt − πˆt−1) , (3.3c)
and for PNt/Pt we obtain
̂(PNt/Pt) = πˆt−1 − πˆt. (3.3d)
Given these relations the log-linear version of both (1.21a) and (1.21b) reduce to
qˆt = ϕqˆt−1. (3.4)
Since we are free to choose the initial condition, it will be convenient to set qˆt−1 = 0
so that we can disregard this variable and can work with the log-linearized aggre-
gate production function (1.5) and the respective market clearing conditions (1.10).
This is also possible in the case of the production function (1.4), since log-linearizing
(1.24) implies ˆ˜Nt = Nˆt. This demonstrates that the common practice not to distin-
guish between Yt and Nt on the one hand side and Y˜t and N˜t on the other is valid in a
linearized model. However, it is not justified to do so if higher order approximations
of the model’s equilibrium conditions are used. In this case one has to resort to the
recursive formulations presented in the previous sections.
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3.3 Forward Looking Phillips Curves
First, we consider the case where the marginal costs do not differ between optimizing
and non-optimizing firms so that gˆjt+s = gˆt+s∀j ∈ [0, 1]. From the point of view of
period t + 1 equation (3.2a) can be written as
pˆt+1 = (1− βϕ)Et+1
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)s
[
s∑
i=1
πˆt+i+1 + gˆt+s+1
]
.
Taking expectations as of period t on both sides and noting that (by the law of
iterated expectations) Et(·) = EtEt+1(·) provides
Etpˆt+1 = (1− βϕ)Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)s
[
s∑
i=1
πˆt+i+1 + gˆt+s+1
]
.
Therefore,
pˆt − βϕEtpˆt+1 = Et
{
(1− βϕ)
[
gˆt + (βϕ)gˆt+1 + (βϕ)
2gˆt+2 + . . .
]
− (1− βϕ)
[
(βϕ)gˆt+1 + (βϕ)
2gˆt+2 + . . .
]
+ (1− βϕ)
[
βϕπˆt+1 + (βϕ)
2
(
πˆt+1 + πˆt+2
)
+ (βϕ)3
(
πˆt+1 + πˆt+2 + πˆt+3
)
+ . . .
]
− (1− βϕ)
[
(βϕ)2πˆt+2 + (βϕ)
3
(
πˆt+2 + πˆt+3
)
+ . . .
]}
= Et
{
(1− βϕ)gˆt +
[
(1− βϕ)βϕπˆt+1
(
1 + βϕ+ (βϕ)2 + . . .
)]}
= Et
{
(1− βϕ)gˆt + βϕπˆt+1
}
(3.5)
Using equation (3.3a) to substitute for pˆt and Etpˆt+1 in equation (3.5) we obtain
ϕ
1− ϕ
πˆt = (1− βϕ)gˆt + βϕ
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
+ 1
)
Etπˆt+1
or
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 +
(1− ϕ)(1− βϕ)
ϕ
gˆt. (3.6)
This is the New Keynesian Phillips curve that appears in a substantial number of
papers.
In case of gAt 6= gNt we use equations (1.14) and (2.3a) to eliminate gˆjt+s from
(3.2a). Since (for ease of writing, I use ˆ˜gt ≡ gˆt in the following paragraphs)
gˆjt+s = gˆt+s −
αǫ
1− α︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:A
(
pˆt −
s∑
i=1
πˆt+i
)
,
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we get
pˆt − βϕEtpˆt+1 = (1− βϕ)Et
{
gˆt −Apˆt + βϕ
(
gˆt+1 −A(pˆt − πˆt+1)
+ (βϕ)2
(
gˆt+2 −A(pˆt − πˆt+1 − πˆt+2)
)
+ . . .
− (βϕ)
(
gˆt+1 − Apˆt+1
)
− (βϕ)2
(
gˆt+2 −A(pˆt+1 − πˆt+2)
)
− (βϕ)3
(
gˆt+3 − A(pˆt+1 − πˆt+2 − πˆt+3)
)
− . . .
}
+ βϕEtπˆt+1,
= (1− βϕ)Et
{
gˆt −A (1 + βϕ+ (βϕ) +
2 + . . .
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1/(1−βϕ)
pˆt
+ Aβϕ (1 + βϕ+ (βϕ) +2 + . . . )︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/(1−βϕ)
pˆt+1
+ Aβϕ (1 + βϕ+ (βϕ) +2 + . . . )︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/(1−βϕ)
πˆt+1
}
+ βϕEtπˆt+1.
Rearranging terms yields
pˆt(1 + A) = (1− βϕ)gˆt + βϕ(1 + A)Etpˆt+1 + βϕ(1 + A)Etπˆt+1. (3.7)
Using equation (3.3a) to substitute for pˆt finally delivers
πˆt =
(1− ϕ)(1− βϕ)(1− α)
ϕ[1 + α(ǫ− 1)])
gˆt + βEtπˆt+1. (3.8)
This is the forward looking Phillips curve that appears in Gal´ı et al. (2001) and
Sbordone (2002).
3.4 Forward and Backward Looking Phillips Curves
Assume gˆjt+s = gˆt+s∀j ∈ [0, 1]. Proceeding as in the previous section, equation
(3.2b) implies
Et [pˆt+1 + πˆt+1] = (1− βϕ)Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)s [πˆt+s+1 + gˆt+s+1] .
Thus,
pˆt + πˆt − βϕEt [pˆt+1 + πˆt+1] =
gˆt + πˆt + βϕ [gˆt+1 + πˆt+1] + (βϕ)
2 [gˆt+2 + πˆt+2] + (βϕ)
3 [gˆt+3 + πˆt+3] . . .
− βϕ [gˆt + πˆt]− (βϕ)
2 [gˆt+1 + πˆt+1]− (βϕ)
3 [gˆt+2 + πˆt+2]− . . .
− βϕ [gˆt+1 + πˆt+1]− (βϕ)
2 [gˆt+2 + πˆt+2]− (βϕ)
3 [gˆt+3 + πˆt+3]− . . .
+ (βϕ)2 [gˆt+1 + πˆt+1] + (βϕ)
3 [gˆt+2 + πˆt+2] + (βϕ)
4 [gˆt+3 + πˆt+3] + . . .
= (1− βϕ) [gˆt + πˆt] . (3.9)
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Rearranging yields:
pˆt − βϕEtpˆt+1 = (1− βϕ)gˆt + βϕEt [πˆt+1 − πˆt] . (3.10)
Substituting from equation (3.3c) for pˆt and Etpˆt+1 delivers
ϕ
1− ϕ
[πˆt − πˆt−1]−
βϕ2
1− ϕ
Et [πˆt+1 − πˆt] = (1− βϕ)gˆt + βϕEt [πˆt+1 − πˆt] .
Collecting terms yields the forward and backward looking Phillips curve that appears
in Christiano et al. (2005) and in Walsh (2005):
πˆt =
1
1 + β
πˆt−1 +
β
1 + β
Etπˆt+1 +
(1− ϕ)(1− βϕ)
(1 + β)ϕ
gˆt. (3.11)
Note that there is an alternative way to write equation (3.2b). Since its rhs
equals:
(1− βϕ)Et
∞∑
s=0
(βϕ)s [πˆt+s + gˆt+s] =
πˆt + gˆt + Et
{
(βϕ) [πˆt+1 + gˆt+1] + (βϕ)
2 [πˆt+2 + gˆt+2] + . . .
− (βϕ) [πˆt + gˆt]− (βϕ)
2 [πˆt+1 + gˆt+1]− (βϕ)
3 [πˆt+2 + gˆt+2]− . . .
}
= πˆt + gˆt + Et
∞∑
s=1
(βϕ)s [πˆt+s − πˆt+s−1 + gˆt+s − gˆt+s−1]
we can also write
pˆt = gˆt + Et
∞∑
s=1
(βϕ)s [πˆt+s − πˆt+s−1 + gˆt+s − gˆt+s−1] . (3.12)
In the case where marginal costs differ between optimizing and non-optimizing
firms we obtain (see also (3.9))
pˆt + πˆt − βϕEt (pˆt+1 + πˆt+1) = (1− βϕ)
× Et
{
gˆt −Apˆt + βϕ
(
gˆt+1 −A(pˆt − πˆt+1) + (βϕ)
2
(
gˆt+2 − A(pˆt − πˆt+1 − πˆt+2)
)
+ . . .
− (βϕ)
(
gˆt+1 − Apˆt+1
)
− (βϕ)2
(
gˆt+2 −A(pˆt+1 − πˆt+2)
)
− . . .
+ πˆt + βϕπˆt+1 + (βϕ)
2πˆt+2 + · · · − βϕπˆt+1 − (βϕ)
2πˆt+2 − . . .
}
= (1− βϕ)(gˆt + πˆt)− Apˆt + βϕAEt
(
pˆt+1 + πˆt+1
)
.
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Replacing pˆt and pˆt+1 yields after a modest amount of algebra the final solution:
πˆt =
(1− ϕ)(1− βϕ)
ϕB
gˆt +
1 + A
B
πˆt−1 +
β(1 + A)
B
πˆt+1,
where: A :=
ǫα
1− α
, B := (1 + A)(1 + βϕ) + β(1− ϕ). (3.13)
Gal´ı et al. (2001) use a different assumption about backward looking behavior.
They also assume that a fraction 1 − ϕ of firms adjusts their price according to
(1.15a). Yet, among those firms that receive the signal to choose their price optimally
only the fraction 1−ω does so. These firms set their relative price according to the
first-order condition (2.10a). We use P fAt to refer to their optimal nominal price.
The remaining ω(1− ϕ) backward looking firms update their price according to
P bAt = πt−1PAt−1, (3.14)
where
PAt :=
[
(1− ω)(P fAt)
1−ǫ + ω(P bAt)
1−ǫ
]1/(1−ǫ)
. (3.15)
is the average of the prices of those firm that truly optimize and the prices of those
firms that adopt a backward looking update formula. The overall price level is still
given by equation (1.17a).
The index formula (3.15) implies
̂(PAt/Pt) = (1− ω)pˆt + ω ̂(P bAt/Pt), (3.16)
where we continue to use the symbol pˆt for the percentage deviation of the optimal
relative price of optimizing firms from its non-stochastic stationary value of unity.
From (3.14) we obtain
P bAt
Pt
=
πt−1PAt−1
Pt
=
πt−1PAt−1
πtPt−1
implying
̂(P bAt/Pt) = πˆt−1 − πˆt +
̂(PAt−1/Pt−1).
Since (note that now ̂(PAt/Pt) plays the role of pˆt in (3.3a))
̂(PAt/Pt) =
ϕ
1− ϕ
πˆt (3.17)
this yields
̂(P bAt/Pt) =
1
1− ϕ
πˆt−1 − πˆt. (3.18)
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Substituting (3.17) and (3.18) into (3.16) we obtain a new relation between pˆt and
the current and lagged rate of inflation:
pˆt =
ϕ+ ω(1− ϕ)
(1− ϕ)(1− ω)
πˆt −
ω
(1− ϕ)(1− ω)
πˆt−1. (3.19)
Since equation (3.7) still gives log-linear approximation to the first-order condition
(2.10a) we find the final solution after substitution for pˆt from (3.19). This yields
πˆt =
(1− ω)(1− ϕ)(1− βϕ)(1− α)
ξ[1 + α(ǫ− 1)])
gˆt +
ω
ξ
πˆt−1 +
βϕ
ξ
Etπˆt+1,
ξ := ϕ+ ω(1− ϕ(1− β)). (3.20)
This is the hybrid Phillips curve equation from Gal´ı et al. (2001). It nests several
models: ω = 0 implies the purely forward looking Phillips curve (3.8), ω=0 and
α = 0 imply the standard solution in (3.6).
4 Example
In order to see how the apparatus presented in the previous sections can be integrated
into a model, I consider a simple New Keynesian macro model taken from Walsh
(2003), Section 5.4.
4.1 The Model
Households. The representative household consumes a basket of goods
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
C
ǫ−1
ǫ
jt dj
) ǫ
ǫ−1
, ǫ ≥ 1 (4.1)
with prices Pjt. Minimizing the costs PtCt =
∫ 1
0
PjtCjtdj of obtaining a given quan-
tity Ct of this basket provides his demand for good j:
Cjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)
−ǫ
Ct, (4.2)
where Pt is the price index defined in (1.2).
In this economy there are two stores of value: nominal money balances Mt and
nominal bonds Bt, both issued by the government. Bonds pay a nominal interest
qt − 1 which is determined at the end of period t − 1 and, thus, a state variable.
The household receives nominal wages Wt and real profits Πt from firms and real
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transfers Tt from the government. His period-to-period budget constraint in units
of the final good Yt is:
Mt+1 + Bt+1
Pt
=
Mt
Pt
+ qt
Bt
Pt
+
Wt
Pt
Nt + Zt +Πt. (4.3)
The household maximizes
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
C1−ηt+s
1− η
+
γ1
1− χ
(
Mt+s+1
Pt+s
)1−χ
+
γ2
1 + θ
N1+θt+s
]
, β ∈ (0, 1), γ1, γ2, ηθ ≥ 0
subject to (4.3) and given initial levels of Mt and Bt.
The first-order conditions of this problem are:
λt = C
−η
t , (4.4a)
N θt =
1
γ2
λtwt, (4.4b)
λt = βqt+1Et
λt+1
πt+1
, (4.4c)
λt
Pt
= γ1
(
Mt+1
Pt
)
−χ
1
Pt
+ βEt
λt+1
Pt+1
, (4.4d)
where wt :=Wt/Pt denotes the real wage rate.
Government. The government’s budget constraint is
Tt +
Mt+1 −Mt +Bt+1 − Bt
Pt
= (qt − 1)
Bt
Pt
, (4.5)
and we assume that each sequence of transfers, interest rates and money balances
satisfies the no Ponzi game condition:
Mt +Bt = −
∞∑
s=0
Pt+sTt+s − (qt+s − 1)Mt+s∏s
i=0 qt+i
.
In this example we consider a simple Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate. Let
q > 1 denote the desired rate, then
qt+1
q
=
(πt
π
)δ
evt , δ > 1, (4.6a)
vt = ρvvt−1 + νt, νt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ν), ρv ∈ (0, 1). (4.6b)
Firms. Each of the j ∈ [0, 1] goods is produced by one firm according to the
production function (1.4). The fraction ϕ of firms that is no allowed to set their
optimal price use the rule (1.15a) to update their nominal price.
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4.2 Dynamics
In a temporary equilibrium of this economy the goods, the labor market, and the
money market clear. For given (xt := st−1, Γ1t, Γ2t, and λt) the 12 equations
C−ηt = λt, (4.7a)
Ct = Yt, (4.7b)
N θt =
1
γ 2
λtwt, (4.7c)
wt = (1− α)g˜tZtN˜
−α
t , (4.7d)
Y˜t = ZtN˜
1−α
t , (4.7e)
Y˜t = stYt, (4.7f)
1 = (1− ϕ) (PAtPt)
1−ǫ − ϕ
(
π
πt
)1−ǫ
, (4.7g)(
PAt
Pt
)
=
µΓ1t
Γ2t
, µ :=
ǫt
ǫt − 1
, (4.7h)
qt+1
q
=
(πt
π
)δ
evt (4.7i)
N˜t = (1− ϕ)N
1−α
At + ϕ
(
Nt
ϕ
−
1− ϕ
ϕ
N
1
1−α
At
)1−α
, (4.7j)
N1−αAt =
(
PAt
Pt
)
−ǫ
Yt
Zt
, (4.7k)
st = (1− ϕ)
(
PAt
Pt
)
−ǫ
+ ϕ
(πt
π
)ǫ
t
st−1, (4.7l)
determine the 12 variables Yt, Ct, Nt, Y˜t, N˜t, pt := PAt/Pt, wt, g˜t, πt, qt+1, st, and
NAt. The model’s dynamics govern the next four equations:
xt+1 = st, (4.8a)
λt+1 = βqt+1Et
λt+1
πt+1
, (4.8b)
Γ1t :=
(
PAt
Pt
) −ǫ
1−α
Y
1
1−α
t Y˜
−α
1−α
t λtg˜t + (βϕ)Et
(
π(PAt/Pt)
πt+1(PAt+1/Pt+1)
) −ǫ
1−α
Γ1t+1, (4.8c)
Γ2t :=
(
PAt
Pt
)
−ǫ
Ytλt + βϕEt
(
PAt/Pt
PAt+1/Pt+1
)
−ǫ(
π
πt+1
)1−ǫ
Γ2t+1. (4.8d)
In order to solve this model via linear or quadratic feed back rules we must
compute the stationary equilibrium of the deterministic counterpart of the model.
This is obtained from (4.7) and (4.8) by ignoring the expectations operator, setting
Zt ≡ 1 and vt = 0 for all t, and dropping the time indices. This delivers PA/P = 1,
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s = 1, g˜ = ǫ/(ǫ− 1), Y = Y˜ , N = N˜ ,
N =
(
1− α
γ2
ǫ− 1
ǫ
) 1
α+η(1−α)+θ
,
Y = Nα = C, and λ = C−η.
Figure 4.1: Impulse Responses to an Interest Rate Schock
Figure 4.1 displays the response of the model to a one time shock of size σν in
the interest rate equation computed with the program NKPC_1.g. The parameters
are α = 0.27, β = beta = 0.994, δ = 1.01, ǫ = 6, η = 2, ϕ = 0.75, θ = 0.5, ρν = 0.50,
and q = π/β with π = 1.0167.
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